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According  to  a  recent  report  from  the  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI),  
40  percent  of  all  corruption  in  international  transactions  occur  in  the  arms  trade  (SIPRI  
Yearbook  2010,  p.  1),  moreover  the  Trade  Promotion  Coordinating  Committee  of  the  US  
Department  of  Commerce  claimed  in  a  March  2000  report  that  the  defense  sector  was  
responsible  for  more  than  50  percent  of  all  bribery  allegations  between  1994  and  1999  
(Magahy  et  al.  2010,  p.  14).  Key  reasons  for  this  concentration  in  arms  trade  corruption  include  
the  high  value  and  therefore  the  importance  of  single  trades  for  individual  countries  and  
defense  suppliers.  Especially  considering  the  increasing  complexity  of  these  security  relevant  
transactions,  that  make  it  harder  and  harder  for  public  managers  to  control  and  communicate  
information  to  superior  authorities  and  the  public.    
When  procuring  armaments,  a  country  must  decide  if  a  weapons  system  or  a  component  can  
developed  domestically  or  should  be  purchased  off-­‐the-­‐shelf  from  a  foreign  supplier.  Beyond  
these  two  possibilities  lie  other  options,  such  as  licensed  production  or  shared  development  
projects  where  the  development  or  production  of  the  good  is  shared  between  the  companies  of  
the  vendor  and  supplier  countries.  Domestic  development  would  theoretically  strengthen  a  
country’s  defense  industrial  base,  secure  jobs  and  technological  know-­‐how  satisfying  the  
specific  needs  of  the  domestic  armed  forces.  Yet  it  is  "also  likely  to  be  the  most  expensive  
option"  (Martin  1996a,  p.  1)  of  maintaining  the  country’s  military  capability.  On  the  contrary,  
off-­‐the-­‐shelf  purchase  means  getting  a  system  that  is  developed  for  another  country's  armed  
forces'  needs,  only  producing  jobs  abroad  and  comports  a  danger  to  the  secure  supply  of  
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needed  parts  and  technical  assistance.  However,  it  is  likely  to  be  significantly  cheaper.  In  order  
to  overcome  the  above  mentioned  dilemma,  many  states  link  their  defense  purchases  to  
compensatory  trade  agreements`,  referred  to  as  ‘arms  trade  offsets’,  ‘countertrade’  or  
‘industrial  participation’.  Offsets  mean  that  a  country  buying  off-­‐the-­‐shelf  military  equipment  
'forces'  the  foreign  supplier  of  the  product  to  reinvest  an  amount  of  the  product  price  into  the  
domestic  industrial  base1.  By  adopting  these  practices  a  country  can  get  a  foreign  military  
system,  not  pay  the  initial  development  costs,  and  –  theoretically  -­‐still  generate  some  domestic  
industrial  benefits.  These  offsets  are  usually  defined  as  some  percentage  of  the  purchasing  
contract  price  and  a  time  period  is  set  for  the  fulfillment  of  it.  Additionally,  when  procurement  
with  an  offset  contract  is  signed,  the  foreign  company  works  directly  with  domestic  companies  
to  fulfill  the  offset  obligation.  A  governmental  authority  monitors  these  processes  and  also  
evaluates  the  performance  of  these  offset  deals.  As  these  additional  processes  and  the  
coordination  of  several  new  stakeholders  lead  on  the  one  hand  to  far  more  complex  
transactions  than  a  basic  outright  purchase,  as  well  as  additional  (transaction)  costs  of  up  to  20  
percent  of  the  original  system  price  (Friedli  et  al.  2009),  the  probability  for  corruption  increases  
as  well.  
Since  the  1970’s  the  number  of  countries  using  countertrade  has  increased  steadily.  While  
countertrade  originally  consisted  mainly  of  barter  agreements  exchanging  goods  rather  than  
using  a  currency  to  ease  transactions  with  countries  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  countries  with  
‘weak’  currencies,  this  is  not  the  case  anymore.  Today,  the  vast  majority  of  countertrade  
                                                                                                                      
1  A  good  definition  can  be  found  in  Martin  1996b.  
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transactions  include  offset  agreements  to  maintain  the  defense  industrial  base  and  increasingly  
the  dual-­‐use-­‐  or  civilian  industry.    More  than  75  countries  worldwide  apply  offset  policies  
regularly  and  several  additional  countries  use  offsets  for  some  specific  procurement  (CTO  Data  
Services  2012).  Most  of  these  countries  possess  only  a  single  governmental  body  with  usually  a  
relatively  small  staff  of  about  five  to  twenty  employees  to  govern  these  deals.  Thus  the  
functions  of  these  agencies  are  relatively  similar  and,  most  importantly,  they  share  the  common  
problem  of  controlling  the  different  offset  deals  between  foreign  vendors  and  domestic  
industries.  
Usually,  offsets  are  seen  as  a  part  of  defense  procurement  and  are  seldom  of  higher  interest  for  
the  general  public,  which  also  holds  true  for  discussions  on  corruption  in  offsets.  While  
corruption  in  arms  trade  in  general  was  always  of  high  interest  for  researchers  and  specialized  
media,  broader  discussions  on  corruption  in  offsets  are  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon.  But  in  
1999,  because  of  the  sheer  amount  of  different  allegations  and  the  high  volume  of  the  
procurement  and  offsets,  the  corruption  within  a  South  African  defense  acquisition  came  to  
public  attention  (Crawford-­‐Browne  2009).  Bringing  further  general  awareness,  Transparency  
International,  a  NGO  specifically  fighting  against  corruption,  published  a  noteworthy  report  and  
started  a  campaign  against  corruption  in  offsets  in  2010  (Magahy  et  al.  2010).  
While  the  overall  economic  effects  of  offsets  have  been  extensively  addressed  in  the  academic  
literature  (Brauer  2004,  p.  54),  corruption  and  the  role  of  the  public  agencies,  and  therefore  
Public  Management,  have  not  been  subject  to  closer  examinations.  This  is  particularly  
unfortunate  given  the  sheer  volume  of  trades  and  money  controlled  by  these  governmental  
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offset  agencies.  In  2006  the  overall  volume  of  offsets  in  participating  member  states  of  the  
European  Defence  Agency  was  estimated  around  5.6  billion  Euros,  which  would  correspond  to  
200-­‐400  million  Euros  per  annum  for  each  member  country  (Eriksson  et  al.  2007,  p.  4).  Even  a  
small  and  neutral  country  such  as  Switzerland  with  no  membership  to  the  EDA  or  the  NATO,  
finds  itself  within  these  same  average  volumes  of  about  300  million  Euros  per  annum  (Friedli  et  
al.  2009).  Although  the  data  is  unavailable  for  countries  outside  of  Europe,  the  volume  for  them  
is  most  likely  in  a  similar  if  not  even  higher  range,  regarding  the  fact  that  some  countries  tend  
to  have  offset  obligations  of  far  beyond  100  percent  and  that  they  were  not  facing  the  same  
amount  of  defense  procurement  budget  cuts  as  European  countries  during  the  last  years.  What  
makes  offset  deals  even  more  prone  to  corruption  is  the  impossibility  to  compare  the  costs  of  
countries.  First,  because  of  the  different  military  requirements  within  the  same  weapon  system,  
and  second,  because  of  additional  coordination  expenses  between  the  foreign  vendor  and  
domestic  companies.  
Unfortunately,  quantitative  data  on  corruption  in  offsets  is  lacking  and  only  a  handful  of  
examples  are  used  in  (academic)  discussions  thus  far.    The  reason  is  that,  aside  from  
speculations  about  the  potential  corruption  risk,  only  a  few  cases  of  corruption  have  been  
widely  discussed.    As  a  consequence,  this  paper  is  aimed  to  start  a  further  discussion  in  Public  
Management  by  giving  an  overview  of  cases  of  corruption  that  have  been  discussed  in  the  
media.  A  comprehensive  survey  and  analysis  of  newspaper  articles  was  conducted  and  the  
results  are  presented  in  this  paper.  The  analysis  contains  the  content  of  250  English-­‐speaking  
and  translated  newspaper  and  magazine  articles  on  corruption  in  offsets  from  1980  through  
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April  2012  that  were  selected  out  of  a  preliminary  search  of  more  than  1000  articles.  It  focuses  
at  first  on  the  following  research  questions:  
1a)  what  allegations  of  corruption  in  offsets  have  been  discussed  in  the  media?  
1b)  which  of  these  allegations  concern  Public  agencies  responsible  for  offsets  and  
therefore  involve  Public  Management?  
While  the  first  research  question  has  the  goal  to  identify  all  publicly  known  cases  of  corruption  
in  offsets  during  the  last  20+  years,  this  second  question  uses  this  data  to  compare  existing  
measurements  against  corruption  with  the  allegations.  It  therefore  addresses  the  following  
question:  
2) does  a  public  agency  have  tools  to  detect  and  fight  possible  cases  of  corruption  in  
offsets?  
  
Method  and  Data  Collection  
To  answer  the  defined  research  questions,  an  analysis  of  newspaper  and  specialized  magazine  
articles  was  conducted.  The  selection  is  based  on  a  LexisNexis  major  world  publication  search  
which  is  also  the  reason  for  a  limitation  on  articles  written  in  English  or  translated  to  the  English  
language.  Even  though  it  is  possible  that  some  of  the  cases  have  not  been  discussed  outside  a  
non-­‐English  speaking  country,  it  is  likely  that  all  major  cases  of  corruption  have  at  least  been  
mentioned  in  prominent  publications  in  the  area  of  armament  and  defense  that  are  available  
via  LexisNexis,  such  as  “Jane’s  Defence  Weekly”,  “Defense  News”  or  “Aviation  Week”  which  
have  the  resources  to  report  on  foreign  defense  news  items.    In  an  initial  collection  set,  all  
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articles  published  between  1980  and  2012  containing  the  words  “defense”,  “offsets”  and  
“corruption”  or  important  synonyms2  in  the  full  text  were  selected.  The  990  resulting  articles  
were  filtered  and  coded  by  hand  to  ensure  that  the  remaining  articles  were  explicitly  dealing  
with  corruption  in  arms  trade  offsets.    The  final  sample  contained  250  articles  from  12  
countries3.  The  sample  was  supplemented  by  academic  papers  and  reports  of  the  same  
timeframe  that  specifically  discuss  questions  regarding  corruption  in  offsets4.  
More  than  half  of  the  articles  (153)  dealt  with  the  aforementioned  South  African  case,  a  case  
also  included  in  all  academic  papers  used  for  the  data  collection.  The  reason  for  this  may  be  the  
uniqueness  of  the  case  as  such  (exceptionally  high  amount  of  offsets,  number  of  different  
allegations5)  but  there  is  a  high  probability  that  it  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that  South  Africa  is  an  
English  speaking  country.  Additionally,  India  (30),  Saudi  Arabia  (15)  and  Australia  (12)  are  
examples  with  relative  good  data,  while  all  other  countries  were  mentioned  between  one  to  
eight  times  in  the  articles.  A  set  of  20  articles  were  texts  where  offset  was  associated  with  
corruption  but  no  example  was  given,  therefore  these  articles  were  not  used  for  the  
categorization  scheme  but  are  included  in  the  discussion  afterwards.    
                                                                                                                      
2  (offset*  OR  countertrade  OR  barter  OR  “industrial  participation”)  AND  (defen*e  OR  military)  AND  (corrupt*  OR  
bribe)      
3  Australia  AU,  Czech  Republic  CZ,  Greece  GR,  India  IN,  Indonesia  ID,  Poland  PL,  Portugal  PT,  Saudi  Arabia  SA,  South  
Africa    ZA,  South  Korea  KR,  Thailand  TH,  United  States  of  America  US  
4  For  example  Magahy  et  al.  2010,  or  Dunne,  Lamb  2004  
5South  Africa  bought  70  JAS  Gripen  from  BAE/Saab  and  got  offered  110  billion  Rand  in  offsets  that  were  said  to  
lead  to  65’000  new  jobs.  
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The  second  part  is  based  on  a  comprehensive  literature  study  on  countermeasures  of  
corruption  in  smaller  governmental  agencies  or  in  the  field  of  public  acquisition,  with  a  focus  on  
academic  papers  in  the  field  of  Public  Management.  
  
Cases  of  corruption  
One  of  the  major  problems  when  studying  corruption              is  the  fact  that  it  is  relatively  hard  to  
narrow  down  the  research  to  specific  cases  of  corruption  because  “definitions  are  
controversial,  and  solid  evidence  is  often  elusive”  (Johnston  1991,  p.  9).  To  have  the  maximum  
number  of  cases  for  further  analysis,  this  paper  will  use  the  relatively  broad  definition  by  
Transparency  International:  “[corruption  is]  the  abuse  of  entrusted  power  for  private  
gain”(Magahy  et  al.  2010).  This  definition  is  even  broader  than  the  definition  of  the  United  
Nations  Development  Programme,  stating  corruption  as  “the  misuse  of  public  power,  office  or  
authority  for  private  benefit  –  through  bribery,  extortion,  influence  peddling,  nepotism,  fraud,  
speed  money  or  embezzlement”  (United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  1999,  p.  7).  
In  addition  to  a  definition  of  what  offset  is,  a  categorization  scheme  is  needed  to  gain  an  
overview  of  the  differences  and  similarities  of  cases  of  corruption  in  offsets.  While  several  very  
general  categorizations  of  corruption  exist,  a  specific  scheme  for  offsets  has  not  been  
developed.  Even  though  the  first  report  of  Transparency  International  had  several  quasi  
categorizations  for  portions  of  offset  processes,  for  example  pathways  from  tender  to  winning  
the  award  (Magahy  et  al.  2010,  p.  18),  none  of  these  were  able  to  include  all  cases  of  corruption  
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found  in  this  analysis.  Therefore,  this  paper  utilizes  a  very  general  method  of  categorization.  
First,  the  cases  will  be  split  up  according  to  the  main  stakeholders  involved.  As  mentioned  
earlier,  the  increasing  number  of  stakeholders  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  a  decreasing  level  of  
transparency.  Next  to  the  most  obvious  groups,  the  foreign  suppliers  and  the  national,  
importing  government,  national  beneficiaries  (mainly  companies)  play  a  major  role  in  the  offset  
business  as  they  are  the  receiver  of  the  offset  obligations.  A  fourth  group  includes  third-­‐party  
entities,  such  as  brokers  or  consultants  (Magahy  et  al.  2010,  p.  13).  It  could  be  reasonable  for  
further  studies  to  further  breakdown  the  government  and  the  national  beneficiaries  into  
subcategories.  So  far,  the  government  includes  the  offset  agency,  as  well  as  the  decision-­‐
makers  that  are  generally  politicians,  or  higher  ranking  officials  on  a  ministerial  level.  National  
beneficiaries  could  be  at  least  divided  into  state-­‐owned  and  private  companies,  as  there  is  a  
high  chance  that  state-­‐owned  companies  are  favored  to  privatized  ones,  as  for  example,  the  
case  of  India  shows  (Raghuvanshi  2005).  Also  splitting  the  defense-­‐from  dual-­‐use  and  civilian  
companies  could  be  of  interest,  as,  depending  on  the  legal  interpretation  of  different  
governments,  the  WTO/GATT  offset  contracts  only  allow  for  security  related  deals  or  also  
include  pure  civilian  beneficiaries6.    Second,  while  the  idea  of  a  division  according  to  the  course  
of  action  within  offsets  seems  to  be  a  good  idea,  it  is  not  understandable  why  corruption  should  
stop  at  the  point  in  time  when  the  contract  is  signed.  Even  though  one  major  scenario  for  
corruption  within  the  arms  trade  as  a  whole  is  as  good  as  done  at  that  point  (one  foreign  
                                                                                                                      
6WTO/  GPA  Article  XVI-­‐1:  Entities  shall  not,  in  the  qualification  and  selection  of  suppliers,  products,  or  services,  or  
in  the  evaluation  of  tenders  and  award  of  contracts,  impose,  seek,  or  consider  offsets.  
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company  wins  the  procurement  against  its  competitors),  other  possible  scenarios  such  as  
national  companies  that  try  to  become  beneficiaries  still  remain.  As  the  offset  contract  as  such  
still  seems  to  be  the  major  turning  point  within  the  process,  the  categorization  will  only  be  
divided  into  a  pre-­‐  and  a  post-­‐  contract  agreement  phase.  
Relatively  similar  cases  have  been  combined  to  get  a  good  overview  of  the  different  methods  of  
corruption  within  offsets.  Additionally,  the  countries  in  which  these  cases  of  corruption  
happened  were  included.  The  articles  are  not  analyzed  statistically  as  multiple  examples  of  the  
same  case  have  no  impact  on  the  severity  or  the  type  of  the  corruption.    
  
Table  1:  Overview  of  cases  of  corruption  in  offsets  
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What  can  be  seen  in  Table  1  is  that  the  number  of  unique  cases  is  very  small,  and  that  only  
seven  different  types  of  corruption  could  be  identified  based  on  the  data  collection.  All  pre-­‐
contract-­‐agreement-­‐cases  have  been  types  of  corruption  where  one  of  the  stakeholders  tried  
to  change  the  competition  between  the  potential  suppliers  to  its  own  benefit,  or  in  other  words  
where  the  government  favors  a  specific  stakeholder  who  provides  favor  usually  in  the  form  of  
rewards.  All  these  cases  can  be  defined  as  public-­‐interest-­‐centered  types  of  corruption  
according  to  Arnold  Heidenheimer  &  Johnston  (2001,  p.  9).The  tender  process  has  been  
manipulated  in  a  variety  of  ways.  For  example  one  of  the  South  African  procurement  decisions  
was  based  on  a  shortlist  that  excluded  the  price  and  therefore  favored  the  proposal  with  the  
best  offset  offer  (Pressly  2011).  Another  example  was  the  bypassing  of  the  Minister  of  Defense  
by  the  Chief  of  the  Air  Force  in  Indonesia  (Roundup:  Trade  deal  for  Sukhoi  jets  turns  politicized  
in  Indonesia  2003)  or  the  temporary  loss  of  all  offset  proposals  by  an  Indian  official  (MyNews  
Interactive  Media  2011).  At  least  for  the  last  case  no  evidence  could  be  found  that  this  was  a  
case  of  corruption,  but  it  can  still  be  seen  as  an  example  of  how  a  tender  process  could  be  
potentially  manipulated.  Cases  where  politicians  or  higher-­‐officials  have  been  bribed  to  
influence  decision-­‐makers  have  been  seen  in  South  Africa  (Agence  France  Presse  -­‐-­‐  English  
9/09/1999)  and  in  Italy  (Pubby  2012).  The  Portuguese  case  is  an  allegation  according  to  which  
an  intermediate  got  30  million  Euro  for  brokering  the  procurement  and  the  offset  contract,  
using  portions  of  the  deal  to  bribe  others,  including  officials  of  the  offset  agency  (Magahy  et  al.  
2010).  In  several  cases  the  fact  that  the  proposed  offset  benefits  have  been  extraordinary  high  
has  been  a  reason  for  corruption  allegations.  For  example  a  U.S.  company  offered  new  jobs  
worth  three  billion  U.S.  dollar  to  the  Polish  government.  “Critics  call  it  what  it  is:  bribes  and  
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corruption”  (Jackson  2003).  By  far  the  biggest  discussions  happened  because  of  the  proposed  
(and  never  completely  realized)  65’000  new  jobs  in  South  Africa  (Crawford-­‐Browne  2009).  
Several  companies  have  also  tried  to  ensure  business  with  the  offset  supplier  by  becoming  a  
compulsory  partner  for  the  foreign  supplier.  This  has  for  example  happened  in  Australia  ('Richo'  
cleared  of  corruption  claims  1995)  or  the  Czech  Republic  (Kominek).    
Other  allegations  of  corruption  can  be  seen  in  the  second  phase  of  the  offset  process.  Multiple  
cases  exist  especially  where  a  company  personally  associated  to  high  ranking  officials  or  
politicians  who  have  been  organizing  offsets  has  been  a  beneficiary.  For  example,  this  was  the  
case  in  South  Africa  where  a  minister  took  up  a  position  in  an  offset  benefiting  company  
directly  following  his  political  term  (Mitchell),  or  where  politicians  were  shareholders  of  such  
companies  (Calland  2011).  These  cases  can  be  defined  as  market-­‐centered  corruption  
(Heidenheimer,  Johnston  2001,  p.  8).  The  last  two  types  are  the  probably  most  mentioned  in  
the  media  but  least  explained  cases.    According  to  several  articles  offset  deals  were  used  as  
bribes.  Unfortunately  there  is  only  one  article  that  gives  an  explanation  on  how  this  could  have  
happened:  In  Korea  a  deal  was  claimed  as  offset  but  the  service  in  return  by  the  national  
company  never  occurred  (Summer  17/09/1998).  These  cases  could  be  defined  as  public-­‐office-­‐
centered  corruptions  even  though  the  payments  seem  to  be  rather  floating  to  private  
companies  than  to  public  officials  (Heidenheimer,  Johnston  2001,  p.  8).  The  last  type  includes  
cases  where  the  foreign  supplier  tried  to  claim  several  offset  deals  incorrectly,  usually  by  
overestimating  the  value  of  the  deal.  Allegations  about  such  cases  have  been  made  in  Australia  
(Richardson  1995)  and  in  Portugal  (Pop  2010).  
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It  is  important  to  mention  at  this  point  that  all  of  these  discussed  types  are  primarily  suspected  
cases  of  corruption.  Most  newspaper  articles  have  been  concerned  with  allegations  but  only  a  
few  of  these  cases  have  been  verified  by  courts  of  justice  later  on.  Additionally,  even  though  
the  types  as  such  comprise  in,  some  cases,  a  risk  of  corruption,  a  portion  of  the  examples  from  
the  newspaper  articles  do  not.  This  will  be  especially  of  importance  of  further  discussions  in  the  
next  part  of  the  paper.    
  
Tools  to  fight  corruption  
Based  on  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  articles,  a  collection  of  different  cases  of  corruption  in  
defense  offsets  could  be  made.  The  question  that  still  needs  to  be  answered  is,  if  governmental  
agencies  dispose  of  tools  that  would  be  useful  in  identifying  or  fighting  these  types  of  
corruption.  A  growing  number  of  academic  papers  have  been  focusing  on  aspects  of  how  to  
fight  corruption  and  different  strategies  have  been  discussed  widely  in  academia  but  especially  
in  policy  papers  of  international  organizations  such  as  the  World  Bank  or  the  OECD.  
Several  different  aspects  have  been  in  the  focus  of  researchers.  On  the  one  hand,  a  theoretical  
discussion  on  drivers  of  corruption  has  been  going  on  since  almost  20  years  based  on  the  
renowned  book  of  Robert  Klitgaard  (1991).  And  even  though  these  theoretical  frameworks  
have  been  discussed  and  re-­‐arranged  widely  (see  for  example  Hors  2001  or  McLinden  2005)  the  
main  ideas  that  corruption  is  driven  by  a  lack  of  efficient  control,  discretionary  power  and  the  
possibility  to  work  within  a  network  still  remain  the  same.    On  the  other  hand,  a  lot  of  
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researchers  have  been  dealing  with  concrete  strategies  that  states  use  against  corruption.  
Especially  the  research  on  anti-­‐corruption-­‐agencies  has  been  relatively  extensive  (see  for  
example  DeSousa  2006,  Klemencic  &  Stusek  2007,  or  just  recently  Quah  2011).  Also  the  
necessity  of  administrative  reforms  (Fjeldstad  2003)  or  the  questions  of  interrelationships  
between  a  reform  such  as  New  Public  Management  and  corruption  (von  Maravic  &  Reichard  
2003)  have  been  discussed  broadly.  What  can  be  seen  is,  that  most  research  and  discussions  
are  held  on  a  national  level  that  end  relatively  fast  in  recommendations  to  introduce  either  new  
national  strategies  and  policies  (Bryane  &  Polner  2008),  or  new  audit  systems  (Baltaci  &  Yilmaz  
2006,  Cantens  et  al.  2010,  or  Ferreira).  The  perspective  of  small  agencies  has  been  of  minor  
interest  to  most  researchers,  even  though  especially  in  discussions  on  audit  or  performance,  
case  studies  on  specific  cases  have  been  made  (Baltaci  &  Yilmaz  2006,  Anderson&  Gray  2007  or  
Cantens  et  al.  2010).  What  these  discussions  share  is  the  introduction  of  new  control  and  audit  
systems.  
Coming  back  to  scenarios  of  corruption  in  arms  trade  offsets  especially  three  aspects  should  be  
discussed  further.  The  overview  of  cases  of  corruption  in  Table  1  shows  that  especially  two  
possible  scenarios  seem  to  happen  when  a  governmental  agency  is  involved.  Either,  a  civil  
servant  is  privately  linked  to  a  company  and  is  therefore  favoring  it  to  other  competitors,  or,the  
civil  servant  gets  a  bribe  from  a  company  and  is  misusing  his  power  usually  by  misinterpreting  
or  manipulating  performance  data.  These  findings  are  concordant  with  especially  two  
Klitgaard’s  drivers  of  corruption  (1991):  the  possibility  to  work  within  a  network  (private  
linkage)  and  the  absence  of  accountability  (misusage  of  performance  data).    
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Most  of  the  cases  of  corruption  in  offsets  show  as  well  the  problem  of  the  lack  of  transparency.  
Klitgaard’s  discretionary  power  is  insofar  a  real  problem  for  corruption  as  it  leads  to  a  
complexity  that  does  not  allow  for  explicit  verdicts.  Therefore  the  question  of  transparency  has  
to  be  further  discussed  as  well.  
Networks  and  Due  Diligence  
Due  diligence  in  offsets  has  been  a  major  point  of  discussion  at  an  industrial  offset  conference  
beginning  of  June.  As  this  will  hopefully  lead  to  the  publication  of  additional  literature  within  the  
next  weeks,  the  writing  of  this  part  has  been  delayed.      
Absence  of  Accountability  and  Performance  Management  
One  of  the  main  allegations  of  corruption  in  South  Africa,  as  well  as  other  countries,  has  been  
the  promise  of  additional  jobs  for  the  national  industry.  For  example,  in  the  South  African  case  
the  foreign  supplier  was  offering  offset  obligations  worth  104  billion  Rand  (approximately  17  
billion  USD  1999)  which  equates  to  three  times  as  high  as  the  procurement  contract  volume.  It  
was  suggested  that  this  sum  would  create  approximately  65,000  jobs.  While  this  number  
implies  an  extreme  example  of  overestimation,  this  is  hardly  the  case  when  realizing  that  each  
of  these  jobs  was  planned  to  cost  more  than  20  times  as  much  as  an  average  job  in  South  
Africa’s  defense  industry  at  that  time  (Dunne  &  Lamb  2004,  p.  288).  Due  to  a  lack  of  data,  it  is  
not  possible  to  calculate  the  exact  number  of  jobs  created  with  the  industrial  participation  
program  in  South  Africa,  but  the  number  is  most  likely  not  even  a  third  as  high  as  estimated.  
Several  articles  have  claimed  that  the  proposed  number  of  jobs  has  been  a  “sweetener”  
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(Unnithan  2005)  for  the  procurement  act  and  a  “key  motivation”(February  &  Calland  2011)  for  
the  whole  deal.  Unfortunately  it  is  not  evident  if  the  proposed  number  of  created  jobs  was  part  
of  the  South  African  contract.    For  a  country  with  an  employment  rate  of  approximately  30  
percent  at  that  time  (Dunne  &  Lamb  2004,  p.  288)  such  an  offer  was  more  than  welcome  but  
usually  only  the  financial  volume  is  defined  in  an  offset  contract.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  that  
this  number  was  defined  and  used  by  the  government  as  an  additional  reason  and  positive  side  
effect  of  the  arms  procurement.  In  the  end  what  happened  was  that  a  supplier  was  not  able  to  
fulfill  all  expectations.    
Another  allegation  in  South  Africa  was  the  usage  of  multipliers  of  the  original  investment  to  
accrue  the  offset  credits  (Ensor  2012).    Unfortunately  this  case  is  not  defined  any  further  but  
the  potential  allegation  is/was  that  the  company  did  not  need  to  invest  the  complete  offset  
obligation  into  the  country.  At  least  in  Europe,  a  majority  of  countries  are  using  multipliers  up  
to  the  factor  ten  (Friedli  et  al.  2009).  This  means  that  an  investment  of  one  million  will  be  
counted  as  offset  deals  worth  ten  million.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  offsets  happen  most  often  
with  companies  that  lack  the  specific  knowledge  of  how  to  produce  a  commissioned  part.  
Multipliers  are  then  used  to  award  the  technology  transfer.  
Both  given  examples,  employment  creation  and  multipliers,  contain  estimates  that  can  be  used  
in  the  worst  case  to  misleadingly  overestimate  the  value  of  offset  deals  and  in  the  best  case  to  
further  complicate  the  process  and  decrease  transparency.  While  it  could  be  said  that  some  
allegations  were  nothing  more  than  misunderstandings,  they  also  show  that  the  usage  of  
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indicators  is  always  dangerous.  Still,  remains  to  be  seen  if  one  of  these  examples  has  been  
counted  as  corruption.  
A  recent  study  on  a  specific  offset  example  in  Switzerland  (Platzgummer,  Gonzales  Llozano  
2012)  suggests  that  companies  tend  to  overestimate  their  offset  obligations  especially  after  a  
phase  of  claiming  offset  obligations  below  average.  The  reason  for  this  is  likely  due  to  the  
company  realizing  that  the  generally  weak  defense  industrial  base  can  only  handle  a  specific  
amount  of  offsets  at  the  same  time7  and  that  the  fulfillment  is  to  be  at  risk  overall.  This  can  lead  
to  severe  penalties  of  up  to  ten  percent  of  the  whole  offset  obligation  (Friedli  et  al.  2009).  Even  
with  very  basic  performance  evaluation  tools  that  only  provide  an  analysis  of  the  claimed  
financial  volumes,  phases  of  achievements  below  the  average  could  be  detected  very  easily.  
The  governmental  agency  should  not  only  have  an  overview  of  the  already  achieved  volume  but  
should  also  be  willing  to  warn  the  foreign  company  in  such  cases.  This  could  prevent  cases  of  
corruption.      
What  can  be  seen  overall  is  that  even  a  very  simple  performance  management  and  audit  
system  would  allow  an  agency  to  detect  the  majority  of  corruption  scenarios.  Insofar,  there  is  
not  really  a  need  to  develop  new  frameworks  or  performance  management  systems  but  to  
ensure  that  a  basic  performance  management  system  is  used  and  that  the  results  are  audited  
internally  to  some  extent.  
                                                                                                                      
7  For  example  with  on  average  300  million  Swiss  Francs  offset  obligations  are  responsible  for  more  than  ten  per  
cent  of  the  annual  volume  of  the  whole  defense  industrial  base  in  Switzerland  Rose,  Platzgummer  2012.  Regarding  
the  fact  that  most  offset  suppliers  are  not  able  to  work  with  the  whole  industrial  base  from  air  system  to  land-­‐  or  
even  sea  system  producer,  suppliers  should  try  to  achieve  a  relatively  balanced  allocation  of  annual  obligations.      
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Discretionary  Power,  Transparency  and  Media  
The  biggest  problem  with  offsets  seems  to  be  the  fact  that  they  lack  transparency  and  increase  
the  level  of  complexity.  More  than  once,  allegations  were  made  that  can  neither  be  agreed  to  
nor  denied.  An  example  of  such  a  case  is  an  allegation  in  Portugal  stating  that  offsets  were  
claimed  for  already  existing  investments  worth  34  million  Euros  (February  &  Calland  2011).  
While  this  sounds  like  a  perfectly  clear  case  of  corruption  in  the  first  place  it  does  not  
necessarily  constitute  as  one.  Most  countries  offer  the  possibility  of  ’banking’  offset  credits.  
This  means  that  a  company  is  allowed  to  claim  a  specific  amount  of  deals  that  have  been  
contracted  with  offset  beneficiaries  before  the  original  offset  agreement  was  signed.  The  
reason  for  this  is  that  government  procurements  can  be  postponed  due  to  tax  cuts  or  political  
changes.  And  due  to  tight  production  schedules  and  a  high  probability  that  national  companies  
need  some  time  to  build  up  the  specific  knowledge,  companies  tend  to  award  first  offset  
contracts  to  national  companies  as  soon  as  the  competition  ends  (but  the  offset  agreement  still  
needs  to  be  discussed  and  signed).  For  example,  Switzerland  is  allowing  20  percent  of  banking  
in  the  current  jet  fighter  procurement  due  to  a  political  adjournment  of  the  procurement  
process  (news.ch  2012).  Again,  this  is  a  possible  excuse  for  the  allegation  but  it  does  not  have  to  
be  the  ultimate  reason.  Chances  that  the  acceptance  of  this  offset  claim  by  the  governmental  
agency  in  Portugal  is  a  case  of  corruption  still  remain.    
While  these  cases  lead  to  a  lot  of  discussions,  the  solution  to  increase  transparency  is  relatively  
easy.  In  2008  the  European  Defence  Agency  launched  the  Code  of  Conduct  on  Offsets  
(European  Defence  Agency  3/05/2011).  While  the  document  does  not  include  important  
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political  aspects  on  offsets  it  has  at  least  increased  transparency.  For  example,  all  25  
participating  member  states  have  to  publish  their  offset  policies  on  the  EDA  webpage.  Future  
cases  such  as  the  above  mentioned  Portugal  banking  case  could  be  clarified  quickly.  
A  second  allegation  that  is  frequently  made  in  the  media  is  that  offsets  are  “no  bribes,  but  
pretty  damn  close”  as  U.S.  Senator  Ross  Feingold  mentioned  it  in  a  speech  (Sennott  1996).    
Even  though  offsets  are  used  as  marketing  tools  within  procurement  competitions,  most  
countries  demand  them  very  actively.  One  of  the  major  accomplishments  of  EDA’s  code  of  
conduct  was  the  confinement  of  offset  obligations  to  no  more  than  100  percent.  Prior  to  this  
code,  several  countries  in  the  European  Union  were  demanding  up  to  200  percent  offset  
obligations  in  defense  procurements.  Volumes  that  some  of  the  companies  can  hardly  
implement  in  the  few  defined  years  of  the  offset  agreement.    
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  researcher  probably  the  most  shocking  aspect  of  the  article  
analysis  is  the  lack  of  knowledge  regarding  offsets  and  the  dishevelment  of  the  allegations.    In  
several  cases  the  journalists  confused  the  terms  offsets  and  barter8,  other  articles  used  
incorrect  definitions  of  special  terms  such  as  direct  or  indirect  offsets  (Pubby  2012),  or  called  
ten-­‐year-­‐old  contracts  illegal  based  on  a  one-­‐year-­‐old  law.  One  article  went  so  far  as  claiming  
that  in  “Bulgaria,  one  of  the  EU's  most  corrupt  countries,  the  government  set  up  a  special  offset  
office  in  the  Ministry  of  Economy”  (EU  code  of  conduct  may  shine  light  on  practice  of  arms  
dealing  2009)  suggesting  that  this  is  in  and  of  itself  is  a  case  of  corruption.    
  
                                                                                                                      
8  e.g.  Agence  France  Presse  -­‐-­‐  English  9/09/1999,  Pressly  2011,  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  MILITARY  IN  SUB-­‐SAHARAN  
AFRICA  Septmeber  1985  
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Also  the  report  by  Transparency  International  includes  several  aspects  where  a  differentiation  
between  corruption  in  the  ‘normal’  procurement  and  corruption  in  offsets  is  not  possible9  
which  decreases  instead  of  increases  the  transparency  within  the  report.    
  
Another  main  actor  of  befuddlement  is  the  United  States  government.    From  the  point  of  view  
of  the  biggest  weapons  exporting  country  it  is  comprehensible  that  offsets  are  everything  but  
favored  as  they  force  U.S.  companies  to  alter  already  existing  supply  chains  and  invest  into  less  
competitive  foreign  countries.  Yet  instead  of  supporting  their  arguments  with  facts  the  U.S.  
government  seems  to  use  the  words  offset  and  corruption  as  a  matter  of  principle  in  the  same  
sentence,  for  example:  Offsets  are  nothing  more  than  economic  bribe  (Hunter  2004),  they  seem  
to  be  a  way  to  bribe  other  countries  to  do  something  (Tolchin  1987)  or  they  foster  corruption  
(Intelligence  Online  17/01/2008).  These  arguments  would  be  taken  more  seriously  without  a  
Buy  American  Act  with  more  or  less  the  same  goals  and  instruments.    
  
What  this  part  of  the  analysis  shows  is  that  not  only  newspapers,  but  also  governments  should  
raise  the  transparency  within  offsets.  Either,  through  explicitly  dedicated  information  portals,  
such  as  the  one  of  the  European  Defence  Agency,  which  offers  at  least  transparent  policies  and  
some  basic  information,  or  through  specialized  education  in  the  form  of  workshops  for  
journalists,  who  focus  on  defense  and  security  topics.    Both  options  would  lead  to  an  increase  
of  transparency  within  even  tight  budgetary  restrictions.    
                                                                                                                      
9  See  for  example  the  case  of  Taiwan  in  Magahy  et  al.  2010  
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A  more  general  concern  is  whether  there  is  really  such  a  big  lack  of  transparency  in  offsets  
(Pressly  2011).  The  problem  with  this  question  is  that  there  are  very  different  notions  of  
transparency.  Regarding  the  fact  that  offsets  are  part  of  a  governmental  procurement  which  
involves  defense  goods,  offsets  are  not  more  or  less  transparent  than  the  rest  of  the  
procurement.  Taking  into  consideration  that  private  companies  are  usually  not  asked  to  
disclose  their  complete  supply  chain  to  everyone  including  their  competitors,  the  lack  of  
transparency  seems  to  be  relatively  small.  Also  from  the  WTO’s  point  of  view,  a  view  that  
supports  free  trade  and  competition  in  a  market,  transparency  is  not  really  missing.  According  
to  article  XVII  of  GATT  both  contracting  partners  can  request  information  about  the  specific  
operations  that  can  have  an  impact  on  the  procurement10.          
Conclusion  
This  paper  had  two  main  intentions:  First,  to  give  an  overview  of  known  cases  of  corruption  in  
offsets  and  second,  to  analyze  if  tools  exist  to  identify  or  even  fight  some  of  the  previously  
defined  cases.    
What  can  be  seen  so  far  is  that  a  relatively  manageable  number  of  different  (known)types  of  
corruption  in  offsets  exist.  It  can  also  be  seen  that  a  focus  on  the  first  part  of  the  offset  process  
from  the  earliest  request  for  proposal  to  the  date  of  the  contract  agreement  cannot  highlight  all  
cases  of  corruption  and  should  therefore  be  reconsidered.    
                                                                                                                      
10  For  a  further  discussion  see  the  very  interesting  article  from  Robert  Howse  2010.  
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So  far,  the  discussion  about  corruption  in  offsets  has  most  of  the  time  focused  on  the  problems  
concerning  the  transparency  and  complexity  of  arms  trade  offsets.  Still,  by  using  the  already  
existing  tools  a  better  part  of  potential  cases  of  corruption  can  at  least  be  overseen.    
The  main  problem  is  that  more  or  less  all  of  these  specific  governmental  agencies  do  not  even  
use  basic  performance  management  and  are  highly  influenced  by  other  stakeholders  to  use  
immeasurable  indicators  such  as  additional  employment  factors.      
Additionally  offsets  seem  to  be  surrounded  by  an  aura  of  ignorance,  definitions  are  misused,  
critiques  are  not  questioned,  and  this  leads  to  a  very  negative  undertone  when  dealing  with  
offsets.  
It  is  important  that  government  officials  dealing  with  offsets  know  that  there  is  a  danger  of  
corruption  and  it  is  even  better  when  they  are  able  to  flag  potential  risks  within  the  process,  
but  it  is  also  important  that  they  realize  that  some  of  the  potential  allegations  are  made  up  out  
of  thin  air  and  that  for  example  a  closer  cooperation  with  media  corporations  could  help  defuse  
a  negative  situation.    
Government  would  be  able  to  increase  the  transparency  but  also  the  usage  of  performance  
management  tools  for  offsets  without  the  implementation  of  new  tools  and  with  relatively  low  
costs.  That’s  where  the  fight  against  corruption  should  start.  
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